Description: EPFAS or Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, launched a coordinated ground assault in several cities across the Tigray, Afar and Amhara regions. The offensive was primarily led by the TPLF which were supported by Amhara and Afar armed groups. Through the assaults, EPFAS managed to seize three federally – controlled airports located in the cities of Mekelle, Shire and Axum. According to the official statement from the Ethiopian government, the TPLF alongside its allies were the primary instigator of the renewed hostilities as they charged the airports and officially shattered the Praetoria agreement from 2022. The TPLF on their part have stated that Ethiopia’s government has been waging a continued aerial campaign against the region, constantly bombing civilian targets with drones. The grievances of the groups against the government unite under the umbrella of governmental neglection, economic decadence in their regions and no political representation in the country’s legislative and executive bodies. The TPLF, as one of the major actors in the coalition, was officially splintered earlier this year, when the militant wing of the organization reestablished their own government administration in the Tigray region, while the political wing of the organization is serving alongside Abiy Ahmed’s government in Addis Ababa. The conflict is also aggravated by foreign influence with Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea all supporting opposition forces against the Ethiopian government, due to various bilateral grievances.
Impact: EPFAS’ rapid military action upon announcing their alliance is highly likely a combination of regional consolidation of power, show of force and unity and military preparedness to wage asymmetrical warfare against the ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Forces) in the short to mid – term period. Despite the renewed fighting, the Praetoria agreement is unlikely completely shattered and likely remains as the most reliable legal framework for establishing a diplomatic and political resolution to the conflict. The TPLF’s branching, the military wing fighting in Tigray and the political wing serving in the current government, likely provides a negotiation venue and a potential diplomatic channel to deescalate the current armed hostilities. The seven armed groups in their united efforts are unlikely to match the military power of the ENDF, and they would highly likely aim at entrenching themselves in the separate regions of control. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s response is unlikely to be a full scale military invasion of the central and northern regions where the groups operate, since his main goal is preserving the government’s public image of legitimacy in front of international partners and painting the TPLF and their allies as the main instigators of the conflict. Instead, he is more likely to opt towards operational containment and opening and renewing channels of diplomacy and negotiation in the short to mid – term period. The EPFAS groups are likely to escalate in the short – term, calibrating their response with the government’s, while in the short to mid – term, they either escalate their engagement with the ENDF and transform the conflict into asymmetrical prolonged warfare or establish open channels of communication with the Ethiopian government. The involvement from foreign actors is likely to intensify the conflict in the short – term, while depending on Ethiopia’s response, Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea could all exert vast amount of influence on the armed factions and either force them to engage Ethiopia’s government through diplomacy or leverage the groups to escalate the conflict.